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Film, Art, and the the Third Culture – hereafter, FACT1 – takes as its starting point
a historical coincidence: at the time of the completion of the book, sixty years
had passed since C. P. Snow’s first published intervention on the topic of the ‘two
cultures’, in 1956. Snow’s arguments on this topic were to ignite a major
intellectual debate across the next decade and beyond, highly visible in the public
sphere on both sides of the Atlantic. A Cambridge physicist turned novelist and
politician, Snow’s career journey was integral to the view he advanced: that
there was a pernicious, and worsening, divide between the ‘cultures’ of 
the natural sciences on the one hand, and the humanities (‘literary intellectuals’)
on the other; and that the divide was harmful both intellectually and in terms of
the practical relevance and benefits of academic research (an ancestor of what in
Britain is now officially termed ‘impact’). Snow did envisage, however, the
possibility (and indeed existing pockets of ) a ‘third culture’, in which scientists and
humanists were ‘on speaking terms’.2 This vision of a third culture, I argue, mirrors
in the public sphere the naturalistic tradition in philosophy – a tradition that, while
consolidating itself under that label in the twentieth century, can be traced all
the way back through the Enlightenment to Aristotle. 
Naturalistically conceived, philosophy is closely aligned with science and
empirical enquiry. Within the sphere of analytic philosophy, naturalism is a highly
influential, indeed probably the dominant, approach to philosophy. It has exerted
some influence on aesthetics, especially in recent years, but it has been less visible
in aesthetics and the philosophy of art than, say, in the philosophies of mind,
science, and even ethics. Chapter 1 of FACT, ‘Aesthetics Naturalized’, reviews
some of the history and sets out the case for a naturalized aesthetics. Theory
construction, as distinct from conceptual analysis, is fundamental to a naturalistic
approach, I argue – where theory construction involves a constant interplay
between conceptual clarification and empirical enquiry, in contrast to the strict
separation of these two activities in (at least orthodox) conceptual analysis. 
Murray Smith
Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, LVI/XII, 2019, No. 1, 95–99 95
1 Jerrold Levinson’s poetically licensed acronym for my Film, Art, and the Third Culture:
A Naturalized Aesthetics of Film (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) – see his
commentary on the book, ‘FACT is a Fact of Both Art and Life’, Projections 12 (2018):
60–70. Levinson’s piece appears as part of a symposium comprising eleven
commentaries on FACT along with my response.
2 C. P. Snow, ‘The Two Cultures: A Second Look’ (1963), in The Two Cultures (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 71.
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(It is interesting to note that Dickie, in writing of the ‘myth of the aesthetic attitude’
in another important essay published not long after he published ‘Is Psychology
Relevant to Aesthetics?’, was in effect pursuing theory construction by holding
the concept of the ‘aesthetic attitude’ to an empirical as well as conceptual
standard. For that is exactly what is implied by the word ‘myth’; if the ‘aesthetic
attitude’ is a myth, it is no more deserving of a place in our thinking about
aesthetic experience than is miasma in our thinking about the transmission of
disease.)3 Chapter 1 also introduces the idea of thick explanation. While thick
description – a well-established method in the humanities – involves a richly
contextualized description and interpretation of a human behaviour or practice,
thick explanation involves the integration of the personal and subpersonal levels
of description (rather than treating these as mutually exclusive or incompatible
perspectives on the mind).
Chapter 2, ‘Triangulating Aesthetic Experience’, sets out an approach to
aesthetic experience consistent with theory construction. The method of
‘triangulation’ involves the integration of the three kinds of evidence available to
us in relation to the mind in general: phenomenological, psychological, and
neurophysiological evidence. As Schellekens observes in her commentary on
FACT, when combined these elements give us the kind of thick explanation
limned in Chapter 1; and in doing so ‘[t]he door is thereby opened to admit, at
least in a limited and principled fashion, the first-person perspective within
a scientific approach to the mind’.4 In the context of the philosophy of mind, such
triangulation occupies the middle ground between radical functionalism
(which gives little or no weight to the significance of neural evidence) and
neurofundamentalism (which holds that, in the long run at least, the brain will
tell us everything there is to know about the mind). If the eliminativism of Patricia
and Paul Churchland constitutes an example of the latter, some of the late Jerry
Fodor’s sceptical writings on brain scanning provide an instance of the former.
A further important feature of triangulation is that no one of the three forms of
evidence is held to be more important than the others, each form of evidence,
considered in isolation, having its limitations. Across the chapter, I explore and
test the model of triangulation in relation to various films and a related range of
aesthetic experiences, with case studies on suspense and empathy. While
suspense and empathy certainly arise outside aesthetic contexts, they are
Film, Art, and the Third Culture: A Précis
96 Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, LVI/XII, 2019, No. 1, 00–00
3 George Dickie, ‘The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude’, American Philosophical Quarterly 1
(1964): 56–65.
4 Smith, Film, Art, and the Third Culture, 117; Elisabeth Schellekens, ‘Psychologizing
Aesthetic Attention’, Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics 56 (2019):
115.
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pervasive enough within the arts that we might consider them basic aesthetic
emotions.
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the two types of evidence at stake in the model of
triangulation which might seem most distant from one another and most in need
of defence as elements of a single explanatory scheme: phenomenological and
neuroscientific evidence. Chapter 3, ‘The Engine of Reason and the Pit of
Naturalism’, considers in detail various neurosceptical arguments, from both the
philosophy of mind and philosophical aesthetics. These arguments, and various
responses to them, are considered in case studies on the startle response and
affective mimicry, demonstrating the contribution made by neuroscientific
findings (especially concerning mirror neurons) to these psychological and
aesthetic phenomena. Chapter 4, ‘Papaya, Pomegranates, and Green Tea’, turns
its attention to the burgeoning field of consciousness studies, and the complex
history of debate about the nature of mind and conscious experience lying
behind this contemporary trend. I explore the way consciousness has been
represented in various traditions of film-making, and the ineliminable centrality
of conscious qualia to aesthetic experience.
Chapters 1 through 4 constitute Part I of the book, ‘Building the Third Culture’.
Taken together, they aim to set out and defend the idea of a third culture, as well
as a set of principles and methods through which such an intellectual culture can
be realized. Part II of FACT, ‘Science and Sentiment’, sets these principles and
methods in motion in relation to the affective and emotional life of cinema –
the ways in which films both represent and elicit emotions – as well as sustaining
the theory building of Part I.
Chapter 5, ‘Who’s Afraid of Charles Darwin?’, explores the expression of emotion
in film, through gesture, posture, the voice, and above all the face, against 
the backdrop of Darwin’s The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals (1872).
Here I consider the vicissitudes of Darwin’s evolutionary account of emotion,
including the rehabilitation and refinement of a Darwinian perspective in 
the hands of contemporary psychologists such as Paul Ekman and Dacher Keltner.
The chapter explores the treatment of emotional expression in a range of film-
making traditions, as well as arguments in early and classical film theory
concerning the (assumed or hoped for) universality of emotion in film, especially
in the ‘silent’ era prior to the introduction of the ‘talkies’. Chapter 6, ‘What
Difference Does It Make?’, continues to explore contemporary research on, and
theories of, emotion, with a particular emphasis on the role of culture in emotional
experience. Rejecting the Hobson’s choice – and the false dichotomy that stands
behind it – between a narrowly biological account of emotion and a ‘culturalist’
perspective according to which biology plays no significant role, I defend
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a biocultural view of emotion (and by extension, of aesthetic experience). 
The emotion of disgust, for example, may have evolved in the first instance as
a barrier against contact with and ingestion of physically harmful substances
(faeces, vomit, rotten food) which hardly vary across cultures. But the bodily
systems supporting such ‘core’ disgust can also be recruited by our higher-order
belief systems, such that we can experience disgust in relation to much more
variable sociocultural acts and objects. (In a similar spirit, Nanay argues that 
‘the top-down influences on our perception that make perception very different
in different periods and different parts of the world […] force us to take 
the cultural variations of our aesthetic engagement seriously, paving the way
to a truly global aesthetics’.)5
Chapter 7, ‘Empathy, Expansionism, and the Extended Mind’, focuses on
empathy and a family of related affective states, continuing the exploration of
such states begun in Chapters 2 and 3, and developed in the final section of
Chapter 5. Here the emphasis is both ‘downwards’, in the direction of the neural
mirroring systems which subtend aspects of empathy, and ‘outwards’ towards 
the environment – the world beyond the skin and the skull into which the mind
extends itself, according to advocates of the theory of the extended mind. I argue
that the overlapping practices and institutions of storytelling, depiction, and
‘fictioning’ (creating fictions) form a major aspect of the extended mind, greatly
enhancing our ability to represent and reflect on the problems – many of them
ethical – arising from interpersonal and larger social interactions. Elaborating
further on the biocultural underpinning of the theory of emotion developed
across Part II, I link these practices and institutions, and the idea of the extended
mind more generally, with niche construction: the capacity of species to adapt
environments to their needs (even as those species are subject to the pressures
of natural selection, that is, to the pressure to adapt to the environment). Culture,
one might argue, is nothing other than niche construction writ large. 
Chapter 8, ‘Feeling Prufish’, pushes beyond the ‘garden-variety’ emotions
(happiness, fear, anger, and the like) which form the basis of most discussions of
emotion in both the philosophy of mind and philosophical aesthetics.
A comprehensive theory of emotion in film and the arts more generally needs to
account for both generic emotions, which often form the basis of specific genres
of art – comedy and horror, for example – and the more peculiar blends of
emotion to which individual works often give expression. To the extent that
the theory presented achieves this, it also shows how any tension between 
the particularizing tendency of art and the generalizing impetus both of 
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the sciences and of philosophy can be reconciled. A naturalistic account of 
the role of emotion in art is well placed to explain both the patterns and
regularities in the world of aesthetics and the arts, as well as the particularities of
individual works which at once emerge from and stand out against the backdrop
of, such regularities.
Murray Smith
Department of Film, University of Kent,
Canterbury, Kent CT2 7UG, United Kingdom
M.S.Smith@kent.ac.uk
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dickie, George. ‘The Myth of the Aesthetic Attitude.’ American Philosophical Quarterly 1
(1964): 56–65.
Levinson, Jerrold. ‘FACT is a Fact of Both Art and Life.’ Projections 12 (2018): 60–70. 
Nanay, Bence. ‘Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception: A Précis.’ Estetika: The Central European
Journal of Aesthetics 56 (2019): 91–94.
Schellekens, Elisabeth. ‘Psychologizing Aesthetic Attention.’ Estetika: The Central European
Journal of Aesthetics 56 (2019): 110–117.
Smith, Murray. Film, Art, and the Third Culture: A Naturalized Aesthetics of Film. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2017.
Snow, C. P. ‘The Two Cultures: A Second Look.’ 1963. In The Two Cultures, 53–100. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Murray Smith
Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, LVI/XII, 2019, No. 1, 00–00 99
Zlom1_2019_Sestava 1  5.4.19  8:01  Stránka 99
